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SUMMARY
The European Union (EU) has evolved a role in the 
management of crises provoked by states perceived to be in 
breach of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the 
outset of these non-proliferation efforts, the EU was 
criticized for the timidity of its reactions. More than  
11 years after the adoption in 2003 of its Strategy against 
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, has the 
EU managed to improve its performance in responding to 
nuclear proliferation crises? This policy brief examines 
how the EU has used the tools in its foreign policy toolbox 
to address nuclear proliferation crises and discovers that a 
steady evolution has taken place. The analysis shows that 
the EU has evolved from a marginal into a key actor over 
the course of different crises and that it has called upon a 
variety of tools in a range of crisis situations, from Ukraine 
to India and Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea and Iran. This 
policy brief specifically explores the nature of the 
instruments selected by the EU in the face of each of the 
challenges to the non-proliferation regime. It discusses the 
key factors accounting for the activation of the EU’s foreign 
policy toolbox following the adoption of its 2003 strategy, 
highlighting pressure by the United States and the 
legitimization of a United Nations Security Council 
mandate as determinants.
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THE EU’S EVOLVING RESPONSES TO NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION CRISES: FROM INCENTIVES 
TO SANCTIONS
clara portela*
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) often prides itself on the 
comprehensiveness of its foreign policy toolbox. The 
ability to combine different instruments to tackle 
issues in a comprehensive approach is considered a 
‘trademark’ of EU foreign policy.1 In the field of non-
proliferation, the gradual improvement of coordination 
in its respective forums has been celebrated as 
encouraging evidence of progress in the development 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).2 
On the other hand, the EU has long been regarded as 
ineffective at addressing proliferation crises. A 2003 
evaluation of its early practice concluded that the 
EU had failed to respond to proliferation crises in a 
timely and coordinated fashion: ‘in the absence of a 
pre-agreed agenda, [the EU] lacks the capability for 
spontaneous action. When responses to proliferation 
crises have been framed, they tended to be slow 
and weak’.3 Since then, the EU has adopted its first 
Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD strategy), published in 
conjunction with the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) in December 2003. More than 11 years after the 
publication of these programmatic documents: has 
the EU made any headway in the mobilization of its 
policy tools to tackle nuclear proliferation crises? The 
*  The author thanks Dr Martin Senn, Lina Grip and an anonymous 
reviewer for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1  Smith, M. E., ‘A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, 
purpose and the EU’s changing global role’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (2011), p.148. 
2  Müller, H. and Van Dassen, L., ‘From cacophony to joint action: 
successes and shortcomings of European nuclear non-proliferation 
policy’, ed. M. Holland, Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record 
and Reforms (Pinter: London, 1997).
3  Portela, C., The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF) Report no. 65 
(PRIF: Frankfurt/Main, 2003), p.19.
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use of the EU’s toolbox to advance non-proliferation 
objectives serves as a trustworthy indicator of the 
evolution of the EU’s commitment to this goal, as well 
as of its internal coherence. The more united the EU 
was in its condemnation of proliferation attempts by 
third countries, the more resources it mobilized to 
mitigate, defuse or resolve crises.
The present paper examines the evolution of the 
mobilization of instruments by the EU in response 
to proliferation crises, defined as situations where a 
state undertakes actions that are regarded by others as 
contravening the non-proliferation regime. To do so, 
it briefly outlines the establishment and consolidation 
of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an 
objective of European foreign policy, and reviews 
the application of policy instruments in each of the 
proliferation crises that have erupted since the early 
1990s: in Ukraine, India and Pakistan, Iraq, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North 
Korea) and Iran.4 Attention is devoted not only to the 
articulation of a common response and the choice of 
instruments employed, but also to the factors that 
contributed to the framing of such a response. A third 
section assesses this evolution over time, discussing 
those factors which account for the activation of the 
EU in this area such as the role played by the United 
States. The paper concludes with an assessment of the 
relevance of the WMD strategy and some reflections on 
the evolving role of the EU in this area.
II. SETTING UP A STRATEGY
Prior to the adoption of the WMD strategy, the 
EU had taken some steps to combat the spread of 
nuclear weapons, most notably through diplomatic 
measures geared towards the universalization of 
relevant international treaties, transparency in 
export controls and the promotion of some regional 
initiatives. However, these dispersed efforts had little 
visibility and were not presented as being part of any 
coordinated strategy. 
The European Council’s adoption of the WMD 
strategy and the ESS simultaneously in December 2003 
signalled that the EU was aiming to bolster its role in 
matters of international security. In implementing 
the mandate to ‘preserve peace and strengthen 
4  The handling of the WMD disarmament of Libya in the 1990s is 
excluded because it was negotiated by the USA and the UK within the 
framework of a settlement over the terrorist destruction of Pan Am 
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988.
international security’ spelled out in the 1992 Treaty 
on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the ESS and 
the WMD strategy anchored non-proliferation firmly 
among the objectives of the EU.5 The EES identifies 
proliferation as ‘potentially the greatest threat to our 
security’, while the WMD strategy claims that the 
‘proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery . . . are a growing threat to 
international peace and security’ and that meeting the 
proliferation challenge ‘must be a central element in 
the EU’s external action’.6 The strategy devotes special 
attention to coordination with external partners, 
singling out the USA among them. Significantly, the 
WMD strategy heralded the routine insertion of non-
proliferation clauses into future bilateral agreements.7 
The ESS lists a number of policies that the EU has 
traditionally employed in its external relations, such 
as assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted 
trade measures.8 It states the desirability of third 
countries currently not prepared to cooperate rejoining 
the international community, and that the EU ‘should 
be ready to provide assistance’. However: ‘Those who 
are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a 
price to be paid, including in their relationship with the 
European Union’.9 In the same vein, the WMD strategy 
claims that ‘the EU must make use of all its instruments 
to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate 
proliferation programmes that cause concern at global 
level’.10 Specifically, it sets out a sequence for the use of 
its tools in which preventive measures take precedence 
over coercive instruments: 
Political and diplomatic preventative measures 
(multilateral treaties and export control regimes) 
and resort to the competent international 
organizations form the first line of defence 
against proliferation. When these measures 
(including political dialogue and diplomatic 
pressure) have failed, coercive measures under 
5  Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht), opened for 
signature 7 Feb. 1992, entered into force 1 Nov. 1993, <http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT>.
6  European Council, ‘A secure Europe in a better world: European 
Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, <http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, p. 3. Council of the European 
Union, EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, 157808/3 (ANNEX), Brussels, 10 Dec. 2003.
7  Council of the European Union 157808/3 (ANNEX) (note 6), p. 5. 
8  European Council (note 6), p.10
9  European Council (note 6), p.10
10  European Council (note 6), p. 8.
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III. RESPONDING TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
CRISES
The activation of the EU as a non-proliferation actor 
started once France had acceded to the 1968 Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-
Proliferation Treaty, NPT) in 1992, which coincided 
with the creation of the CFSP.15 The emphasis of EU 
action was placed on backing non-proliferation efforts 
through nuclear-related assistance programmes, in 
particular the threat reduction efforts in Russia funded 
by the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (TACIS) programme. These 
were designed to help the successor states to the 
Soviet Union destroy WMD arsenals and establish 
verifiable safeguards, thereby preventing the diversion 
of materials for illegal trafficking. In the same period, 
the EU started to respond, with varying degrees of 
intensity, to nuclear proliferation crises in which 
actions by third states were perceived to contravene the 
non-proliferation regime.
Ukraine: Reluctant relinquishment of Soviet nuclear 
weapons 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it became a 
Western priority to ensure that none of the successor 
states that hosted its nuclear weapons—Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine—took possession of them 
and emerged as new nuclear powers. To this end, 
Russia and the USA signed a Protocol to the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) in Lisbon in 1992. 
The first proliferation crisis to erupt in the post-cold 
war period took place when the parliament in Kyiv 
refused to ratify the Lisbon Protocol, which provided 
for the repatriation to Russia of the nuclear weapons 
deployed in Soviet times on the territory of Ukraine, 
as well as the latter’s accession to the NPT as a 
non-nuclear weapon state. The Ukrainian executive 
branch and military sought to obtain a veto on the use 
of these weapons, while nationalists in the parliament 
portrayed their retention as essential to preserving the 
country’s independence.16 In the event, Ukraine was 
15  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-
Proliferation Treaty, NPT), opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered 
into force 5 Mar. 1970, INFCIRC/140, 22 Apr. 1970, <https://www.iaea.
org/publications/documents/treaties>.
16  Foran, V. and Spector, L., ‘The application of incentives to 
nuclear proliferation’, ed. D. Cortight, The Price of Peace: Incentives 
and International Conflict Prevention (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, 
1997), p. 39.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international 
law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions 
of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) 
could be envisioned.11
The use of sanctions to advance non-proliferation 
goals is reflected in the EU’s programmatic document 
on the employment of sanctions, Basic Principles 
for the Use of Restrictive Measures, published a few 
months after the ESS. It stipulates that ‘the Council 
will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support 
of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction’.12
The adoption of the WMD strategy boosted EU 
activity considerably. The strategy resulted from the 
‘shock’ produced by the US and British intervention in 
Iraq to reverse a purported case of WMD proliferation. 
The decline in US leadership on arms control in favour 
of counterproliferation compelled the EU to become 
a more active supporter of the multilateral regime. 
The decision by the USA to intervene militarily in Iraq 
seriously damaged both transatlantic relations and the 
CFSP, and the framing of a strategy to respond to WMD 
proliferation was intended to re-establish consensus. 
Shortly after the adoption of the strategy, awareness 
of nuclear proliferation issues increased dramatically 
in EU circles, as evidenced by the allocation of about 
25 per cent of the CFSP budget to non-proliferation 
activities.13
The EU’s activism on non-proliferation matters took 
place in parallel with an upgrade of the role of the 
United Nations Security Council in this area, making 
the increased salience of non-proliferation a wider 
international phenomenon. The first UN sanctions 
regime against WMD proliferation was imposed on 
Iraq after its forced withdrawal from Kuwait in 1991. 
In 2006, the UN imposed sanctions on both North 
Korea and Iran for the first time. Despite its relative 
novelty, non-proliferation firmly anchored itself on 
the Security Council agenda: in the three-year period 
2006–2009 the only new sanctions regimes agreed by 
the Security Council were those intended to advance 
non-proliferation or anti-terrorism goals.14
11  European Council (note 6), p. 5.
12  Council of the European Union, ‘Basic principles for the use of 
restrictive measures (sanctions)’, 10198/1/04 REV 1, 7 June 2004.
13  Tertrais, B., ‘The European Union and nuclear non-proliferation: 
does soft power work?’, International Spectator, vol. 40, no. 3 (2005).
14  Eckert, S., ‘United Nations non-proliferation sanctions’, 
International Journal, vol. 65, no. 1 (2009).
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persuaded to ratify the protocol thanks to negative 
security assurances provided jointly by Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the USA as the NPT depositary 
states, alongside direct financial contributions offered 
by the USA.17 In exchange for Kyiv’s accession to the 
NPT, the Budapest Memorandum was signed in 1994. 
Under this agreement, Russia, the UK and the USA 
committed ‘to respect the independence, sovereignty 
and existing borders of Ukraine’ and provide assistance 
to Ukraine if it ‘became a victim of an act of aggression 
in which nuclear weapons are used’.18 For its part, 
the EU contemplated making Kyiv’s renunciation of 
nuclear weapons a precondition for the negotiation and 
signature of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA). Eventually, this proposal was abandoned 
in favour of deferring the implementation of the 
agreement until Ukraine acceded to the NPT. 
The EU response: A unified ancillary role
Against the background of Ukraine’s dire economic 
situation, the country’s elites recognized that the its 
survival depended on Western economic assistance. 
The government in Kyiv was successful in obtaining 
benefits in the form of security assurances and direct 
payments in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear 
weapons. The EU was united in its response. Given that 
the repatriation of the nuclear weapons to Russia was 
part of the post-cold war settlement, the EU did not 
emerge as an actor in the preparation of the Budapest 
Memorandum. While the ratification of the PCA by the 
EU was not the principal incentive offered to Ukraine 
in return for signing the Lisbon Protocol, the EU’s 
contribution complemented US efforts.19 The link 
between compliance with non-proliferation obligations 
and the provision of EU assistance can be regarded as 
a precursor of the WMD clause, which was launched 
10 years later and has been routinely inserted into 
EU bilateral agreements since.20 The commitments 
17  Müller, H., ‘European nuclear non-proliferation after the NPT 
extension: achievements, shortcomings and needs’, eds P. Cornish, 
P. Van Ham and J. Krause, Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation, 
Chaillot Paper no. 24 (Institute for Security Studies of Western 
European Union: Paris, 1996). 
18  United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, 
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s 
accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
A/49/765, S/1994/1399, 19 Dec. 1994. 
19  Müller (note 17).
20  For details of the WMD clause see Council of the European 
Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—
mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations 
with third countries’, 14997/03, 19 Nov. 2003; and Grip, L., ‘The European 
under the Budapest Memorandum ultimately failed to 
prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. This has 
important—if seldom debated—implications for arms 
control and non-proliferation. Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and support for separatist elements in eastern 
Ukraine has diminished the already meagre prospects 
of restricting the role of tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe, and has put in doubt the credibility of negative 
security guarantees given to states that renounce 
nuclear weapons.21
India and Pakistan: Testing nuclear weapons and the 
non-proliferation consensus 
The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan 
in May 1998 constituted one of the most prominent 
challenges to the non-proliferation regime. While 
the USA imposed sanctions in response to the tests, 
these measures were gradually lifted soon after. Only 
four months after their imposition, the US Congress 
authorized the president to lift sanctions provided 
both countries complied with certain arms control 
demands.22 Although the international community was 
united in its condemnation of the tests, the responses 
by individual EU member states differed in intensity 
and were not coordinated. The European Parliament 
adopted a resolution urging India and Pakistan to 
refrain from any further tests and to adhere to the NPT 
and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT).23 Certain EU member states, such as Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden, froze their development aid, 
while others limited their responses to condemnatory 
declarations. Some EU member states did not react 
at all: NPT latecomers such as France and Spain 
maintained that India and Pakistan had not breached 
any norm, given that they were not NPT signatories.24 
At the UN Security Council, France expressed its 
opposition to unilateral sanctions, arguing that 
Union’s weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation clause: a ten 
years assessment’, Non-proliferation Papers, no. 40 (Apr. 2014). 
21  Meier, O., ‘The Ukraine crisis and the control of weapons of mass 
destruction’, SWP Comments, no. 30 (June 2014).
22  Meier, O., ‘Involving India and Pakistan: nuclear arms control and 
non-proliferation after the nuclear tests’, BITS Research Report 99.2 
(Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit (BITS): 
Berlin, 1999).
23  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for 
signature 24 Sep. 1996, not in force, <https://treaties.un.org/pages/
CTCTreaties.aspx?id=26&subid=A&lang=en>.
24  Portela (note 3). 
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with labour rights or basic human rights.29 The CFSP 
measures adopted six months later consisted of 
incentives rather than sanctions.
Iraq: The weapons of mass destruction that never 
existed
EU member states failed to articulate a unified stance 
on the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The military 
operation in Iraq constituted a proliferation crisis to 
the extent that it was largely justified by allegations 
that Iraq possessed a WMD arsenal. EU member 
states had long been divided over the Iraq question. 
Following Baghdad’s refusal to allow UN inspectors 
into the country in December 1998, the USA, the UK 
and France conducted periodic strikes on Iraq despite 
the absence of a UN Security Council mandate. After 
France withdrew from the raids, the USA and the UK 
continued the bombing campaign until the diplomatic 
crisis escalated in 2002. Although Baghdad eventually 
allowed UN inspections in a bid to dispel suspicion 
of an alleged WMD programme, the evidence these 
produced failed to assuage the concerns in Washington 
and London. Efforts to frame a common EU approach 
proved unsuccessful. The European Council repeatedly 
condemned Iraq for its lack of cooperation. Part of 
the EU sided with the USA, most notably the UK but 
also Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as well as the 
recently acceded Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Belgium, France and Germany opposed a military 
intervention.
The EU response: The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy disaster
While the EU was deeply and obviously divided 
over Iraq, this lack of unity did not mean a lack of 
commitment to the non-proliferation norm, but rather 
disagreement over the means to address allegations 
of non-compliance. This concerned the permissibility 
of the use of force in the absence of a Security Council 
mandate as well as doubts about the robustness of the 
evidence of the existence of Iraqi WMD programmes. 
The US leadership galvanized only some of its allies.30 
Apart from causing a transatlantic rift, the severity of 
the disagreement over Iraq called into question the 
29  Portela and Orbie (note 26).
30  Stahl, B., ‘Incoherent securitization: The EU in the Iraq crisis’, 
Hamburg Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008).
sanctions ‘were not the right method for attempting to 
ensure that India joins . . . the NPT’.25
Even so, a common EU response was framed. In 
addition to declarations inviting both countries to join 
the NPT and the CTBT, the European Council took 
some measures outside the CFSP framework. In the 
aftermath of India’s tests, the Council instructed the 
European Commission to reconsider India’s eligibility 
for trade preferences. Following Pakistan’s tests, the 
Commission extended this consideration to Pakistan, 
temporarily postponing the impending conclusion of a 
Cooperation Agreement.26 Six months after the tests, a 
CFSP Common Position pledged to support the ‘efforts 
of the international community to achieve enhanced 
confidence-building among India and Pakistan and 
in the region’, including the organization of seminars, 
forging links with European think tanks, and offering 
technical assistance on the implementation of export 
controls.27 
The EU response: A weak reaction
The response by the EU—late, uncoordinated and 
weak—was characterized as a ‘slow declaratory 
policy’.28 Despite the fact that all the EU member states 
were parties to the NPT by 1998, their lack of consensus 
was symptomatic of a still tenuous commitment to 
the non-proliferation norm. Some members went so 
far as to temporarily suspend aid, but for others the 
non-signatories of the NPT had not violated any norm. 
The laxity of the EU’s reaction was also a reflection of 
the half-heartedness of the US response. By then, it was 
already shifting towards a pragmatic accommodation 
of India’s nuclear status outside the NPT framework. 
Like the USA, EU member states were reluctant to 
antagonize South Asian actors whose importance 
was bound to increase in the coming decades. As a 
consequence, trade preferences were not withdrawn. 
Indeed, this was one of the last instances where such 
a move was contemplated for reasons unconnected 
25  Vaillant, D., Remarks by French Government spokesperson Daniel 
Vaillant, 13 May 1998, as quoted in ‘France opposes US sanctions on 
India over tests’, Reuters, 13 May 1998.
26  Portela, C. and Orbie, J., ‘Sanctions under the generalized system 
of preferences “GSP”: coherence by accident?’, Contemporary Politics, 
vol. 20, no. 1 (2014), p. 70.
27  Common Position 98/606/CFSP of 26 Oct. 1998 on the European 
Union’s contribution to the promotion of non-proliferation and 
confidence-building in the South Asian region, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L290, 29 Oct.1998.
28  Hassan, O., ‘Securitising proliferation, failing security 
governance: the European Union’s role in India and Pakistan’s nuclear 
rivalry’, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 11, no. 2 (2013).
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CFSP as a political project. At the same time, however, 
it had the effect of boosting support for a consensual 
plan on how to address proliferation and how to ensure 
the security of the EU, which crystallized into the ESS 
and the WMD strategy shortly afterwards.31
North Korea: The remote Non-Proliferation Treaty 
defector 
The management of the proliferation crisis in North 
Korea that erupted in 1994 was led by the USA, which 
reached agreement with Pyongyang on the ‘US–North 
Korean Agreed Framework’ of 1994. At the centre 
of US crisis-management efforts was the Korean 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an entity 
created in 1995 with the task of building two light 
water reactors (LWRs) in exchange for Pyongyang 
dismantling its nuclear programme.32 In 1997, the EU 
joined the Executive Board of KEDO, on which it was 
represented by the European Commission by virtue of 
its European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
competencies.33 The EU’s financial contribution of 
$122 million was the fourth largest after those of the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan and the USA.34 
However, the European Parliament was critical of 
the fact that the EU’s involvement in KEDO entailed 
a significant EU financial contribution without 
benefiting European industry.35 Thus, when the treaty 
between Euratom and KEDO was renewed in 2000, its 
terms were made more favourable. The first contract 
had provided for a seat on the Executive Board, staff 
positions at the KEDO Secretariat in New York, and 
31  Kienzle, B. and Portela, C., ‘European Union non-proliferation 
policies before and after the 2003 strategy: continuity and change’, 
eds S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis and C. Portela, The EU’s Performance 
in the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Palgrave: Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, 2015).
32  Council Joint Action 96/195/CFSP of 5 Mar. 1996 on participation 
of the European Union in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), Official Journal of the European Union, L063,  
13 Mar. 1996.
33  Smith, M. E., ‘The quest for coherence’, eds A. Stone Sweet, 
W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein, The Institutionalisation of Europe 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001). 
34  Yoon, S. and Suh, J., ‘Nuclear non-proliferation’, eds T. Christiansen, 
E. Kirchner and P. Murray, The EU-Asia Handbook (Palgrave: Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, 2013).
35  European Parliament, Proposal for a Council decision approving 
the conclusion by the Commission of an agreement between the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Human rights, Common Security and Defence Policy 
(Rapporteur: Jas Gawronski), Brussels, 4 Dec. 2001.
access for EU companies to some contracts for the 
construction of the two LWRs. The new contract in 
2001 provided for a new high-level post for an EU 
citizen at the KEDO Secretariat, improved access to 
contracts for EU-based companies, exclusion from 
liability in the event of an accident and a commitment 
that decision making by the Executive Board would 
continue to be on the basis of consensus.36 On the 
political front, the Swedish Presidency of the EU 
dispatched a high-level delegation to Pyongyang in 
2001 to establish diplomatic relations. The EU also 
launched a human rights dialogue, and pledged 
repeatedly to review future cooperation with North 
Korea in the light of progress on nuclear issues, 
attempting to use economic relations as an incentive. 
Revelations in October 2002 that Pyongyang was 
developing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme 
led KEDO’s Executive Board to interrupt heavy fuel oil 
deliveries. The European Parliament froze a €20 million 
($21 million) contribution to KEDO ‘until North Korea 
proved that it was willing to respect the international 
non-proliferation regime and had discontinued its 
programme for the production of nuclear weapons’.37 
In the event, the European Commission terminated its 
technical assistance.
A more adversarial phase ensued following a series 
of tests conducted by Pyongyang, which, importantly, 
triggered action by the UN Security Council. 
Following a test launch of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear testing in 2006, the UN banned the transfer of 
aircraft and equipment related to WMD and ballistic 
missile programmes to North Korea, and imposed 
a partial arms embargo and a ban on luxury items. 
Pyongyang’s attempt to launch a missile and carry out 
an underground nuclear detonation led the Security 
Council to strengthen the sanctions in June 2009. 
Among other things, states were authorized to inspect 
cargo travelling to and from North Korea, even on the 
high seas, and to refuse bunkering services to North 
Korean vessels if they were suspected of carrying 
banned items. In response to Pyongyang’s satellite 
launch in December 2012 and its third nuclear test in 
February 2013, the Security Council extended its list 
of banned luxury goods and of individuals affected by 
36  Portela, C., ‘The European Parliament and the external dimension 
of EU nuclear non-proliferation policy’, eds S. Stavridis and D. Irerra, 
The European Parliament and its International Relations (Routledge: 
London, 2015).   
37  European Parliament, Resolution on the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organisation (KEDO), B5-0573/2002, Brussels, 4 Nov. 2002.
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The EU’s choice of instruments evolved in 
conjunction with broader international action. From 
the outset of the crisis, the EU’s position has consisted 
of endorsing US initiatives and complementing them 
by additional means. The US leadership obtained EU 
support for its unilateral incentive efforts in the form 
of KEDO, but it did not manage to convince the EU to 
impose sanctions on Pyongyang before the UN took 
action. Prior to the imposition of UN sanctions, the EU 
had not placed any restrictions on North Korea. Once 
the Security Council became active, the EU’s zealous 
implementation of sanctions invited comparison with 
the approaches taken by Australia or Japan rather 
than with the lax implementation by South Korea, 
Russia and especially China.42 Nonetheless, while 
EU measures currently go beyond UN requirements, 
they are still some distance from US measures. Most 
notably, they fall short of proscribing trade and remain 
more limited than the comprehensive US sanctions.43 
In addition, the EU continues to provide humanitarian 
and food aid, agricultural support, assistance in 
the energy sector, and market economy training. 
Unsurprisingly, on account of the negligible economic 
exchange between the EU and North Korea, the impact 
of EU sanctions has hardly been noticed. Only the UN 
arms embargo and US financial measures are reported 
to have visibly disrupted North Korean economic 
activity.
Iran: Approaching the nuclear threshold
The Iranian nuclear crisis, undoubtedly the most 
prominent proliferation crisis of recent decades, 
emerged in September 2003 when the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed allegations 
that Tehran was secretly building facilities designed 
to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium.44 
Before the crisis, US and EU policies on Iran diverged 
considerably. While the US approach emphasized 
containment and isolation, the EU followed a policy of 
‘constructive engagement’. Within this framework, the 
EU conducted a political dialogue and was negotiating 
a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which 
42  Taylor (note 39).
43  Vennesson, P. and Portela, C., ‘European sanctions and embargoes 
in Asia’, eds T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner and P. Murray, The EU-Asia 
Handbook (Palgrave: Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2013).
44  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Board of Governors, 
‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’, GOV/2003/69, 12 Sep. 2003.
asset freezes and travel bans. In addition, cash transfers 
to North Korea above a certain amount were prohibited 
and certain financial activities were restricted.38
When giving effect to Security Council resolutions, 
the EU defined the arms embargo on Pyongyang in 
more stringent terms: it imposed a full arms embargo 
covering the EU common list of military equipment, 
instead of the narrow version stipulated in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1718, and supplementary lists were 
drawn up of prohibited items, and of persons and 
entities subject to the assets freeze and travel ban.39 
The inclusion of supplementary unilateral measures 
when implementing UN resolutions is made possible 
by the fact that UN measures need to be transposed 
into EU legislation—CFSP Common Positions before 
the implementation of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty and 
Council Decisions since implementation—offering an 
opportunity to insert additions into the transposing 
document.40 The EU agreed further bans, including 
one on trade in new public bonds from North Korea, 
a ban on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds 
with North Korean public bodies and a ban on the 
delivery of new North Korean denominated banknotes 
and coinage to the central bank. There were also bans 
on the opening of new branches of North Korean banks 
in the EU, on joint ventures between North Korean and 
European financial institutions, and on the opening of 
offices of European banks in North Korea.
The EU response: From carrots to sticks
Contributing to KEDO was acclaimed as one of the 
EU’s first nuclear non-proliferation actions, and as 
proof of its commitment to multilateralism.41 The EU 
has been consistently united in its responses, which 
have moved from a strategy of incentives to one of 
sanctions. This acclaim, however, should be tempered 
by the fact that the EU was not invited to participate 
in the six-party talks (the parties to the talks, which 
began in 2003, were China, Japan North Korea, South 
Korea, Russia and the USA). Not playing a political role 
at any stage made disagreements among EU member 
states less likely. 
38  UN Security Council resolutions 1695, 15 July 2006; 1718, 14 Oct. 
2006; 1874, 12 June 2009; and 2087, 22 Jan. 2013. See also Charron, A., 
United Nations Sanctions and Conflict (Routledge: London, 2013).
39  Taylor, B., Sanctions as Grand Strategy (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS): London, 2010).
40  Treaty of Lisbon, signed 13 Dec. 2007, entered into force 
on 1 Dec. 2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>.
41  Tertrais (note 13); and Yoon and Suh (note 34).
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UN sanctions against Iran supplement the pre-
existing US sanctions regime, in force since 1987 and 
upgraded in 1996. Once Tehran started to enrich 
uranium to 20 per cent, the EU moved closer to the 
US approach. Every time the UN Security Council 
imposed mandatory sanctions, the EU agreed 
supplementary entries to the UN lists, or adopted 
more stringent prohibitions than those stipulated in 
the Security Council resolutions. Having failed to 
obtain agreement on more far-reaching sanctions 
at the UN, this step enabled the EU to unilaterally 
enact measures supported by the Western members 
of the EU3+3 but not included in the Security Council 
resolutions due to Chinese or Russian resistance.48 
While the UN sanctions package was composed of a 
series of measures focused on preventing the transfer 
of proliferation-sensitive material and knowledge, in 
addition to an arms embargo, the EU agreed additional 
measures not directly related to proliferation.49 These 
included bans on: the import of oil, petroleum and 
petrochemical products as well as natural gas; the 
export to Iran of equipment used for the production of 
oil and natural gas and in the petrochemical industry; 
investment in the Iranian oil and gas industries; the 
provision of insurance and re-insurance to Iranian 
entities; the supply of key naval equipment for 
shipbuilding and maintenance; and financial transfers 
to Iranian banks, exempting those for food, health 
and humanitarian supplies and personal remittances. 
Only 78 of the 493 entities featured on EU prohibition 
lists were designated by the UN.50 Replicating the 
approach it followed in the initial phase of the crisis, 
the EU accompanied sanctions with incentives. It 
offered to suspend the sanctions in return for the 
suspension of enrichment activities in Iran, in a 
‘suspension-for-suspension’ formula, moving later to 
a ‘freeze-for-freeze’ offer that gave a commitment that 
there would be no new sanctions in return for a freeze 
of enrichment activities in Iran.51 
The election of President Rouhani in 2013 meant that 
an interim deal could be struck. Under the agreement, 
concluded in Geneva in November 2013, Tehran agreed 
to neutralize its stocks of enriched uranium, freeze the 
48  Meier, O., ‘European efforts to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear 
programme’, Non-proliferation Papers, no. 27 (Feb. 2013).
49  UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 27 Dec. 2006; 1747, 24 Mar. 
2007; 1803, 3 Mar. 2008; and 1929, 9 June 2010.
50  Portela, C., ‘EU strategies to tackle the Iranian and North Korean 
nuclear issues’, eds Blavoukos, Bourantonis and Portela (note 31).
51  Kienzle (note 45).
was halted on account of the uranium enrichment 
issue. Prior to the adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1737 of December 2006, the EU did not 
have any sanctions in place against Tehran. The EU3—
France, Germany and the UK—took the lead in the 
nuclear crisis owing to the refusal of the administration 
of US President George W. Bush to entertain direct 
contacts with Tehran. The talks had a strong EU slant 
thanks to the inclusion of the EU’s High Representative 
for CFSP, Javier Solana, in the negotiating team in 
December 2003. Solana was succeeded by Catherine 
Ashton in 2009. In these negotiations, the EU offered 
several incentives, such as support for a civilian 
nuclear programme in Iran, stronger commercial 
ties, including in the energy and aviation sectors, the 
completion of the TCA negotiations, and support for 
Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization.45 
The Paris Agreement of November 2004 represented 
an early success of EU efforts: Tehran agreed to 
freeze its enrichment activities and to sign an IAEA 
Additional Protocol in exchange for the trade and 
technology incentives offered by the EU.46 However, 
implementation of the agreement was frustrated 
following the election of President Ahmadinejad in 
2005, who announced that Iran would start enriching 
uranium at 20 per cent. The EU3 then encouraged the 
adoption of a resolution by the IAEA, which eventually 
referred a file to the UN Security Council. In turn, 
the Security Council agreed sanctions intended to 
halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment and reprocessing 
activities in December 2006. Subsequent negotiation 
rounds continued to be led by Ashton, who was 
now representing the EU3 and the non-European 
permanent members of the Security Council (China, 
Russia and the USA)— a group labelled the ‘EU3+3’. The 
EU sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1747 of 
March 2007, which spelled out that sanctions would be 
suspended if Tehran froze all its enrichment-related 
and reprocessing activities. In June 2010, the Security 
Council agreed a new round of sanctions, expanding 
the arms embargo.47
45  Kienzle, B., ‘Between human rights and non-proliferation: norm 
competition in the EU’s Iran policy’, UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 30 
(Oct. 2012).
46  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Communication 
received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the 
agreement signed in Paris on 15 Nov. 2004, INFCIRC/637, 26 Nov. 2004.
47  UN Security Council Resolution 1929, 9 June 2010; and Charron 
(note 38).
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hoc creation that withstood the test of the negotiations 
and ultimately proved successful is evidence, however, 
of the unsuitability of the existing CFSP toolbox.
The unsatisfactory results of the EU’s initial 
insistence on an incentive-based strategy and the 
search for a negotiated solution facilitated its eventual 
embrace of the coercive measures imposed by the 
USA. The positions of the EU and the USA eventually 
converged as both sides’ stances evolved. The EU only 
resorted to sanctions after the incentives pathway 
proved futile. In previous decades, EU member states 
had resisted US pressure to adopt unilateral sanctions 
regimes, even benefiting from the US commercial 
withdrawal from the targeted countries.55 By contrast, 
the Iranian uranium enrichment programme 
galvanized EU support for US unilateral sanctions to 
an unprecedented extent. Such support was motivated 
by Europe’s commitment to preserving the NPT. 
As illustrated by the statement by the President of 
France, François Hollande, in which he asserted that 
the situation threatened world peace, the desire to 
prevent a military attack on Iran by Israel or the USA 
was compelling.56 While the measures against Iran 
constituted one of the most far-reaching sanctions 
packages imposed by the EU to date, paralleled only 
by the restrictions on Syria, EU sanctions fell short of 
the more comprehensive US measures, which featured 
a ban on trade and investment, a prohibition on access 
to US financial institutions and even sanctions with 
extraterritorial application.57
EU unilateral sanctions had a magnifying effect on 
existing measures. Their combined impact on Iran’s 
economy was considerable.58 Sanctions restricting 
Tehran’s ability to use the international financial 
system had a particularly strong impact.59 Owing to EU 
legislation, a number of Iranian banks were isolated 
from the international internet banking transfer 
system operated by the Belgium-based Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
55  Niblock, T., Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East (Lynne 
Riener: Boulder 2001).
56  Hollande, F., Speech at the opening debate of the 67th General 
Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 25 Sep. 2012; and 
Bergenäs, J., ‘The European Union’s evolving engagement with Iran’, 
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 17, no. 3 (2010).
57  Portela (note 50).
58  Sagedhi-Boroujerdi, E., Sanctioning Iran: Implications and 
Consequences (Oxford Research Group: Oxford, 2012); and Parsi, 
R., ‘Iran in the shadow of the 2009 Presidential Elections’, ISS EU 
Occasional Paper, no. 90 (April 2011).
59  Esfandiari, D. and Fitzpatrick, M., ‘Sanctions on Iran: defining and 
enabling success’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 5 (2011).
construction of new centrifuges, allow access by IAEA 
inspectors to the relevant sites and cease enrichment at 
20 per cent. In exchange, the EU3+3 eased the sanctions 
with a relief package that included a suspension of the 
ban on the provision of transportation and insurance, 
and of the restrictions on the trade in gold and precious 
metals, and allowed certain imports of technology for 
the automobile industry and exports of petrochemicals, 
as well as the repatriation of $4.2 billion in previously 
frozen export revenues obtained from the sale of 
Iranian oil and lodged in overseas banks.52 After Iran 
halted uranium enrichment in line with the Geneva 
deal, the EU suspended its sanctions. After protracted 
negotiations, a more durable settlement was reached 
in Lausanne in April 2015. In exchange for a 15-year 
freeze on uranium enrichment and full access by UN 
inspectors, the USA and the EU agreed to lift most of 
their sanctions. 
The EU response: A first experiment in leadership 
The EU’s efforts to manage the Iranian nuclear issue 
have rightly been acclaimed as the ‘most ambitious 
and high-prolife action taken by the EU in the field 
of non-proliferation’.53 From the point of view of 
the EU’s use of its diplomatic toolbox, two notable 
developments stand out. Firstly, this was the first 
time the EU took a leadership role in nuclear crisis 
management. It did so despite the initial opposition 
of the US administration, which sought to persuade 
the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the issue to the 
Security Council from the start. Once the positions of 
the EU and Washington converged, however, the EU 
shared a leadership position with the USA. Secondly, 
in order to take the lead in negotiations with Iran, it 
created a format that was previously absent from its 
CFSP toolbox: that of the EU3. Originally, this informal 
arrangement encountered some resistance from 
some member states, as it did not coincide with the 
institutionalized format of the EU troika which rotates 
among all member states, but instead privileged the 
‘big three’. In the event, the EU’s High Representative 
was tasked with assuaging such concerns, although 
the High Representative complemented rather than 
replaced the EU3.54 The EU3 survived the broadening 
of the negotiating group to become the EU3+3. This ad 
52  Habibi, N., ‘A closer look at Sanctions Relief’, Iran Matters, 9 Dec. 2013.
53  Meier (note 48).
54  Farmanfarmaian, R., ‘Iran and the EU: re-assessing the European 
role’, ed. L. Marchi, An EU Innovative External Action? (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing: Newcastle, 2011).
10 eu non-proliferation consortium
in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. He was 
found to have been involved for decades in a black 
market in nuclear technology that supplied uranium-
enrichment centrifuges, nuclear warhead designs, 
missiles and know-how to Iran, Libya, North Korea 
and possibly other countries. Revelations about the 
Khan network sparked unprecedented action by the 
UN, which had developed a high degree of sensitivity 
to the role of non-state actors in international security 
as a consequence of the terrorist attacks on the USA 
of 11 September 2001, and to nuclear proliferation 
as a consequence of the debate on Iraq. In April 
2004 it adopted Security Council Resolution 1540, 
which for the first time required states: to enact 
laws prohibiting non-state actors from developing, 
acquiring or transferring WMD; to enforce domestic 
control, physical protection and border control 
measures to prevent proliferation to non-state actors; 
and to control the provision of funds and services 
that contribute to non-state proliferation. Aware 
that many states would require help to abide by the 
terms of the resolution, the Security Council inserted 
a clause recognizing ‘that some States may require 
assistance in implementing the provisions of this 
resolution within their territories and invites States in 
a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in 
response to specific requests to the States lacking the 
legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation 
experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above 
provisions’.63 According to the Security Council’s 1540 
Committee, 56 states have so far requested assistance 
with the implementation of the resolution.64 The EU 
followed up on this encouragement by extending 
financial and technical support to third states to help 
them meet their Resolution 1540 obligations. Shortly 
after the adoption of the resolution, the EU conducted 
an awareness campaign among third states, and its 
implementation support has gradually gone beyond 
supporting 1540 Committee activities to encompass 
funding for the IAEA’s nuclear security activities, and 
for the implementation of export controls and border 
security.65 Another important follow-up by the EU was 
the setting up of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
63  UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 April 2004, para. 7.
64  Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 
1540 (2004), ‘Summary requests for assistance from member states’, 
accessed 20 June 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/assistance/
requests-for-assistance-from-states.shtml>.
65  Grip, L., ‘The role of the European Union in delivering Resolution 1540 
implementation assistance’, Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 22 (Oct 2012).
(SWIFT). Sanctions on the energy sector targeted 
a key vulnerability, given that oil export revenues 
represent nearly 80 per cent of Iran’s total export 
earnings and account for almost 20 per cent of its gross 
domestic product. The effect of the ban on insurance 
for oil shipments was equally severe. Since European 
companies insure and re-insure 95 per cent of the world’s 
tanker fleet, the ban on insurance led to the reduction 
or even suspension of Iranian crude oil shipments to 
India, Japan and South Korea until alternative insurance 
cover could be found. Significantly, the Iran sanctions 
had some noticeable effects not only on Iran, but also 
on several European economies—a phenomenon rarely 
witnessed in previous EU sanctions policy.60
The EU’s political role has been acclaimed for 
preventing an escalation and for keeping diplomatic 
channels open.61 It has also been credited for 
facilitating the resumption of high-level contacts 
between the USA and Iran as well as paving the way 
for the UN to find common ground.62 Initially, the 
sanctions did not dissuade the leadership from its plans 
to build up enrichment capabilities. However, over 
time they provoked growing domestic criticism of the 
Ahmadinejad Government for failing to prepare for 
international sanctions. Because they weighed heavily 
on the popular discontent that brought about the 
victory of the moderate Rouhani (a former negotiator 
in the nuclear talks who campaigned on the promise of 
obtaining sanctions relief) in the 2013 elections, they 
are credited with having compelled the change in the 
Iranian position that made agreement at Geneva and 
Lausanne possible. If the Lausanne Agreement of April 
2015 is implemented satisfactorily, it will bring an end 
to the crisis. 
The Khan network: Bringing non-state actors into non-
proliferation efforts
The exposure in January 2004 of a clandestine trade 
network in nuclear technology represents the only 
recent proliferation crisis with a non-state actor 
at its centre. At the heart of the network was the 
Pakistani engineer, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a key figure 
60  Portela, C., European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy 
(Routledge: London, 2010).
61  Kienzle, B., ‘A European contribution to non-proliferation? The EU 
WMD strategy at ten’, International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 5 (2013).
62  Alcaro, R. and Bassiri Tabrizi, A., ‘European and Iran’s nuclear 
issue: The labours and sorrows of a supporting actor’, International 
Spectator, vol. 49, no. 3 (2014).
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by entities in which EU member states are represented: 
the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The 
IAEA had to conclude an agreement with India similar 
to those it has in place with the recognized nuclear 
powers. In addition, the NSG, an informal grouping of 
states capable of supplying nuclear technologies, had to 
issue a waiver to allow nuclear technology transfers to 
India. Initially, Austria and Ireland, supported by the 
Netherlands and Sweden, were reluctant to agree to the 
exceptions for fear of weakening the non-proliferation 
norm. Allowing a country in breach of the NPT to 
benefit from the privileges of recognized nuclear 
weapons states was seen as undermining the regime, 
and possibly encouraging non-compliance. However, 
resistance was weakened due to pressure from EU 
member states with large nuclear industries and by 
the prospect of diminished economic opportunities in 
India. In the event, the EU refrained from challenging 
any of the India-specific exceptions. Prior to the 
meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, on which 
several EU member states sit, the EU decided it would 
neither oppose an agreement nor call for a vote. 
Instead, Austria and the Netherlands simply joined 
Costa Rica and Norway in drafting a declaration 
expressing reservations.69 Similarly, the NSG, where 
all EU member states are represented, approved the 
waiver for India in the summer of 2008 without any 
opposition.
The EU response: Unified but inconsistent 
Although not formally involved in the US–India deal, 
EU member states had the ability to force a vote in the 
IAEA and enjoyed a veto power at the NSG. However, 
they refrained from taking action that could have 
frustrated the implementation of the agreement, 
despite the fact that its terms ostensibly undermine the 
non-proliferation norm the EU purportedly wishes to 
preserve. Ultimately, the prospects of lucrative deals 
with India, coupled with reluctance to antagonize the 
USA and an emerging Asian power, prevailed. Indeed, 
following the adoption of the waiver, France concluded 
an agreement with India, and both France and the UK 
allowed nuclear exports to India. The EU showed a 
high degree of internal cohesion under US leadership, 
albeit, paradoxically, in support of measures contrary 
to the NPT. While the reaction to the 1998 tests by 
India and Pakistan was meek, the EU had at least been 
69  Kienzle, B., ‘The exception to the rule? The EU and India’s challenge 
to the non-proliferation norm’, European Security, vol. 24, no. 1 (2015).
Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence 
worldwide, shifting the focus of its non-proliferation 
assistance away from Russia to encompass regions 
where it had not been active previously, such as South 
East Asia.66
The EU response: Funding as positioning 
At first sight, it seems counterintuitive that a non-
state actor features among the list of most relevant 
proliferation crises of the past two decades. However, 
the magnitude of the efforts devoted by the EU to aid 
the implementation of Resolution 1540 justifies its 
inclusion. The resolution was not adopted without 
controversy: the authority of the Security Council to 
impose obligations of a legislative kind was contested 
by several countries, not least India. The generally poor 
record on reporting on implementation, an obligation 
under the resolution, reveals a widespread lack of 
capacity, but also suggests some degree of resistance.67 
Through its support for implementation, the EU has 
positioned itself firmly as committed to detailed 
follow-up. If properly implemented, Resolution 1540 
represents a significant strengthening of international 
standards related to the export of sensitive items and 
preventing non-state actors such as terrorists and illicit 
networks from gaining access to chemical, nuclear or 
biological weapons. 
The US–Indian nuclear deal: Accommodating the Non-
Proliferation Treaty outsider 
The most salient nuclear power outside the NPT, and 
formerly one of the treaty’s most vocal critics, India 
has recently begun to push for acceptance within 
the regime as a nuclear weapon state. These efforts 
bore fruit when India signed a framework agreement 
with the USA in 2005, which paved the way for the 
US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008. Under 
the agreement, India was to place its civil nuclear 
facilities under the control of the IAEA in exchange 
for upgraded civil nuclear cooperation with the USA.68 
Even though EU member states were not party to the 
bilateral deal, its implementation required concessions 
66  Zwolski, K., ‘Institutions and epistemic networks in EU non-
proliferation governance’, eds Blavoukos, Bourantonis and Portela (note 31). 
67  Evans, G., Ogilvie-White, T. and Thakur, R., Nuclear Weapons: The 
State of Play, 2015, (Australian National University: Canberra, 2015).
68  Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Joint statement between 
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’, 
18 July 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.
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constituted an anti-climax in terms of EU support for 
the NPT, it nonetheless demonstrated a striking degree 
of unity from the viewpoint of intra-EU coordination.
Instruments: Transitioning from incentives to coercive 
tools
Before the WMD strategy, EU responses to 
proliferation crises were almost exclusively 
comprised of ‘carrots’ (i.e incentives). The only 
‘sticks’ (i.e. penalties) used consisted of the 
threatened or actual withdrawal of the carrots. 
Conspicuously, the nature of the carrots and sticks 
was intimately related to the core activities of the 
EU—cooperation agreements, trade preferences and 
the provision of technical assistance or aid—rather 
than characteristic of the traditional toolbox of state 
actors.
The EU’s first reflex is—and always has been—to 
resort to incentives. The proclivity of the EU to offer 
incentives rather than wield sanctions is typical of 
an actor with an established role in development 
cooperation but scant experience in security policy. 
This dovetails with research that shows that it is 
institutionally easier for the EU to agree on the 
provision of aid and incentives than on sanctions.72 
Indeed, openness to dialogue characterized early 
initiatives in the field, exemplified in the EU’s 
establishment of diplomatic relations with North 
Korea in May 2001 while the USA maintained its 
confrontational approach. In the early stages of a 
crisis, the EU invariably attempted to use its trade 
and economic leverage to advance non-proliferation 
objectives, thus anticipating the subsequent 
introduction of WMD conditionality, The EU offered 
contractual cooperation as an incentive in the cases 
of Ukraine and Iran. However, the incentive-based 
approach showed its limitations after India and 
Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests: the offer of 
confidence-building measures and export control 
assistance appeared to come close to rewarding 
objectionable behaviour.
After the Iraq shock and the WMD strategy, the EU 
exhibited an increased readiness to employ sticks, 
most notably in the North Korean and Iranian crises. 
Over time, and as a result of the setbacks suffered in 
72  Hazelzet, H., ‘Carrots or sticks? EU and US reactions to human 
rights violations, 1989–2000’, unpublished PhD dissertation, European 
University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2001. 
unified in condemning rather than condoning India’s 
nuclear status.
IV. EVALUATING EU RESPONSES TO
PROLIFERATION CRISES
In evaluating EU responses to proliferation crises, the 
central question remains how the choice of instruments 
to address proliferation has evolved over time, and 
how to account for this evolution. The analysis below 
considers the degree of unity within the EU and the 
extent to which a common response was framed, the 
nature and mix of the tools employed and the role of US 
leadership. In doing so, it stresses the significance of 
the WMD strategy of 2003 as a turning point. 
EU coordination and visibility: From marginality to 
prominence
Before the publication of the WMD strategy, EU 
responses to proliferation crises were inconsistent. In 
terms of EU internal coordination, attempts to frame 
a unified stance were uneven, almost displaying a 
weakening trend. The EU was unified with regard to 
Ukraine, but much less so in responding to the tests 
by India and Pakistan. Notably, in relation to Iraq 
it was unable to frame a common response. After 
the adoption of the WMD strategy, however, the 
EU exhibited a considerable level of unity in facing 
proliferation challenges. Disagreements surfaced in 
the European Council, but these could be surmounted. 
This is particularly remarkable given the fact that the 
crises that ensued have been protracted, in contrast 
to the rather short-lived pre-strategy episodes. 
Management of the situation in North Korea has dragged 
on for 20 years, and the Iranian crises for 10 or more. 
Exceptionally, the Iran nuclear case has even profiled 
the EU as a manager of proliferation, allowing it to 
acquire unexpected prominence in international 
security.70 The EU was the sponsor of several IAEA 
resolutions and the initiator of the UN sanctions 
regime, drafting a majority of the resolutions.71 The 
High Representative’s role as the lead negotiator, 
representing the views of the UN Security Council, 
improved the image of the EU as a bridge-builder. 
Although consent to the NSG waiver for India 
70  Blavoukos, S. and Bourantonis, D., ‘Do sanctions strengthen the 
international presence of the EU?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 
vol. 19, no. 3 (2014).
71  Farmanfarmaian (note 54).
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Cooperation with the USA: Convergence with distance
The EU’s WMD strategy singled out the USA as a 
key partner in non-proliferation efforts, reflecting 
an ambition to re-engage the one time leader of arms 
control in multilateral processes. The proximity 
between the EU and the USA in the field of WMD 
non-proliferation increased following the adoption of 
the WMD strategy. It is illustrative that, in contrast to 
the other strategic partnerships of the EU, all member 
states attend the political dialogue meetings between 
the EU and the USA.76 With the notable exception 
of the Iraq crisis, EU responses to proliferation 
have invariably been in consonance with the US 
stance. When the USA takes on a leadership role, EU 
responses have tended to complement its actions, 
as exemplified in the 1992 Ukraine crisis or the EU 
funding of KEDO. When the USA frames a half-hearted 
response, as happened with the South Asian tests, the 
EU reaction is found wanting. In the only case where 
the EU took a leadership role—Iran—it first pursued 
‘constructive engagement’ in open contradiction to 
the US policy of containment. The original decision to 
engage Iran in nuclear negotiations reflected the EU’s 
unease about the counterproliferation policy of the 
Bush administration.77 However, after transatlantic 
relations improved once President Barack Obama 
took office in 2008, and the USA eventually succeeded 
in persuading the EU to impose tough economic 
measures against Iran in 2010, the USA and the EU 
acted in tandem. Following the Geneva Agreement of 
November 2013, analysts complained that the EU had 
gradually relinquished the initiative to the USA.78 In 
sum, while initially intent on developing an alternative 
approach to that of the USA, the EU stance came closer 
to Washington. Nonetheless, the EU approach to the 
use of sanctions is evidence of the persistence of a 
differential between the transatlantic partners. EU 
sanctions never achieved the level of severity of the 
US restrictions, which approximated a comprehensive 
embargo.79 The EU’s design of restrictive measures 
76  Renard, T., ‘Partnering for a nuclear free world: The EU, its 
strategic partners and nuclear non-proliferation’, European Strategic 
Partnerships Observatory Working Paper, no. 3 (Oct. 2013).
77  Rynning, S., ‘Europe’s emergent but weak strategic culture: The 
case of the EU, Iran and nuclear weapons diplomacy’, eds K. Engelbrekt 
and J. Hallenberg, The European Union and Strategy (Routledge: 
London, 2008).
78  Alcaro and Bassiri Tabrizi (note 62).
79  Portela, C., ‘European and Chinese perspectives on the handling 
of the Iranian nuclear question’, eds J. Wouters, J. C. Defraigne and 
the negotiating processes, it warmed to the use of 
security policy tools, or sanctions. The discovery of 
North Korea’s clandestine nuclear facilities in October 
2002 prompted the EU to discontinue its technical 
assistance, a measure that followed the termination 
of heavy fuel deliveries to North Korea. With aid 
withheld, the next step was to impose restrictions. The 
opportunity arose with the adoption of mandatory 
sanctions by the UN Security Council, starting in 
2006. Once the Security Council became active in 
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, the 
EU moved to adopt unilateral restrictions. Initially, 
the EU limited itself to implementing UN measures. 
However, during the process of transposing UN 
Security Council resolutions into EU legislation, it 
started to designate additional entities and individuals, 
and subsequently introduced supplementary measures 
absent from the UN mandate. Out of frustration with 
the lack of progress and with the difficulty of agreeing 
measures at the UN, the EU ended up imposing more 
severe measures than those stipulated by the Security 
Council. While the EU’s unilateral measures against 
North Korea are of marginal significance, the sanctions 
package against Iran was characterized as the broadest 
unilateral sanctions regime ever adopted by the EU.73
The use of funding as an instrument to support 
non-proliferation efforts has not disappeared. The 
enthusiastic support for implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540, following the revelation of 
the clandestine Khan network, demonstrates that it 
is still an option. Despite the EU’s long experience 
of non-proliferation support, the funding modalities 
might still need to evolve, in particular given that the 
support for international organizations has originated 
from the CFSP budget, which was designed with 
urgent needs in mind.74 The provision of funding 
by one regional organization for projects to be 
implemented by a different international organization 
has been highlighted as an unusual phenomenon.75 
Drawing a parallel with the developments witnessed 
in the handling of the North Korea and Iran crises, 
channelling assistance through UN agencies in support 
of UN objectives provides EU non-proliferation 
activities with additional legitimacy, while underlining 
the EU’s commitment to multilateralism. 
73  Meier (note 48).
74  Grip (note 65), p. 10.
75  Kienzle (note 61), p. 1158.
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is characterized by a marked desire to avoid 
humanitarian consequences and to comply strictly 
with international law that was not relinquished even 
when the sanctions activities reached their apex. 
Thus, a comparison of EU and US unilateral sanctions 
shows an increasing convergence of the Iran policies 
of the transatlantic partners, while at the same time 
confirming their differences. 
However, the EU’s adoption of autonomous sanctions 
in support of non-proliferation cannot be accounted for 
exclusively with reference to the galvanizing role of the 
USA. Even though US pressure undeniably constituted 
the main ‘push’ factor compelling the EU to resort to 
unilateral measures, it should once again be noted that 
the EU did not agree any unilateral restriction against 
North Korea or Iran before the UN Security Council 
imposed mandatory sanctions. As with North Korea, 
the UN’s seizure of the issue facilitated consensus 
within the EU, which felt legitimized to enact 
measures beyond the proliferation-related restrictions 
authorized by the Security Council resolution. Thus, 
the UN activation constituted a ‘threshold’, the crossing 
of which enabled the EU to adopt supplementary 
sanctions.
Conclusions: The EU’s toolbox and its embrace of non-
proliferation
The management of proliferation crises emerges as a 
field in which the EU has upgraded its role dramatically 
since the release of the WMD strategy. The above 
analysis confirms that the WMD strategy heralded a 
shift as the EU proved increasingly willing to articulate 
a common stance and progressed from an incentive-
based approach to unilateral sanctions.
The activation of sanctions testifies to a full embrace 
of the non-proliferation norm by the EU and its rise to 
become a political priority. The USA has followed its 
declared policy of imposing sanctions in order to stem 
nuclear proliferation since the implementation of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, but neither the 
UN nor the EU had established similar practice before 
1992.80 The UN imposed non-proliferation sanctions 
M. Burnay, China, the European Union and the Developing World, 
(Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2015). 
80  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, US Public Law 95-242, 
signed into law on 10 Mar. 1978, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg120.pdf>. Miller, J., ‘The secret 
success of non-proliferation sanctions’, International Organization, 
vol. 68, no. 4 (2014).
for the first time following the discovery of Iraq’s 
clandestine nuclear programme in the aftermath of 
the latter’s invasion of Kuwait. The non-proliferation 
sanction measures taken to address the situation 
in North Korea and Iran were only the second and 
third instances of the use of such measures in the 
history of the UN. For its part, the EU had never 
imposed autonomous sanctions in response to nuclear 
proliferation challenges prior to the UN Security 
Council’s activity in this field. During the early crisis 
episodes, the lack of coordinated EU responses 
beyond condemnatory declarations was evidence that 
consensus on the significance of the non-proliferation 
norm had not yet been reached, despite the fact that 
all the EU member states had ratified the NPT, which 
by then had been extended indefinitely. A decade on, 
the Iranian and North Korean crises constituted the 
first instances in which the EU agreed autonomous 
sanctions in pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation 
goals. The 2010 round of sanctions against Iran was 
the first time that energy restrictions were imposed 
in a situation that was not characterized by violent 
conflict.81 Autonomous sanctions imposed in pursuit 
of non-proliferation objectives remain rare in the 
EU’s post-Maastricht Treaty sanctions experience, 
where sanctions imposed in support of human rights 
and democratic rule predominate. Nonetheless, in 
order to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation 
in the Middle East, the EU has, for the first time, been 
willing to bear the notable costs of imposing economic 
sanctions.
81  Portela (note 60).
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ABBREVIATIONS
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
ESS European Security Strategy
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
KEDO Korean Energy Development 
Organization
LWR Light water reactor
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
START-1 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication
TACIS Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States
TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
A EUROPEAN NETWORK
In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to 
create a network bringing together foreign policy 
institutions and research centres from across the EU to 
encourage political and security-related dialogue and the 
long-term discussion of measures to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
their delivery systems.
STRUCTURE
The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly 
by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close 
cooperation with the representative of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour 
la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research 
Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The 
Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the 
core of a wider network of European non-proliferation 
think tanks and research centres which will be closely 
associated with the activities of the Consortium.
MISSION
The main aim of the network of independent non-
proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of 
measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, 
particularly among experts, researchers and academics. 
The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to 
conventional weapons. The fruits of the network 
discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and 
recommendations to the responsible officials within the 
European Union.
It is expected that this network will support EU action to 
counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also 
establish cooperation with specialized institutions and 
research centres in third countries, in particular in those 
with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation 
dialogues.
http://www.nonproliferation.eu
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EU NoN-ProlifEratioN CoNsortiUm
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks
FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH 
FRS is an independent research centre and the leading 
French think tank on defence and security issues. Its team of 
experts in a variety of fields contributes to the strategic 
debate in France and abroad, and provides unique expertise 
across the board of defence and security studies. 
http://www.frstrategie.org
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN FRANKFURT 
PRIF is the largest as well as the oldest peace research 
institute in Germany. PRIF’s work is directed towards 
carrying out research on peace and conflict, with a special 
emphasis on issues of arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament.
http://www.hsfk.de
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC 
STUDIES
IISS is an independent centre for research, information and 
debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that 
have, or potentially have, an important military content. It 
aims to provide the best possible analysis on strategic trends 
and to facilitate contacts. 
http://www.iiss.org/
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to 
research into conflict, armaments, arms control and 
disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, 
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to 
policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. 
http://www.sipri.org/
